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The Agency of Relations at Baoshan 
Wendi Adamek 
 
Word and Image at Baoshan 
For medieval Chinese Buddhist practitioners, carving inscriptions and images 
in stone was an important part of devotional and mortuary practice. In this 
paper I discuss sixth- and seventh-century mortuary niches at a site known as 
Baoshan 寶山 [Treasure Mountain], in Henan, China. At sites such as this, 
stone-working techniques went hand-in-hand with the technologies of 
realisation, shaping one another to shape the landscape. Three kinds of ‘work’ 
linking word and image are highlighted. Buddhist textual and visual ‘good 
works’ are supported by the Buddhist doctrines of merit (puṇya) and skilful 
means (upāya). At Baoshan, there is the work of memorialisation, the 
processes of transmuting deceased members of the practice community into 
enduring presences through the carving of mortuary niches. Second, the work 
of carving eulogies and images is part of the transformation of a landscape into 
a collective responsive field of merit, an ongoing process that I characterise as 
a ‘practicescape.’
1
 Finally, there is the individual practitioner’s process of 
transforming ‘self’ into realisation of buddha-nature, which the founder of the 
site describes using metaphors connoting both individual effort and natural 
response. These three related Buddhist works of word and image involve a 
shift in focus from the agency of actors to the agency of relations, which I 
discuss with reference to the work of Bruno Latour and Andrew Pickering. 
 
Backgrounds and Baoshan 
Over the years, working on mortuary niches for Chinese Buddhists carved on 
Baoshan and nearby Lanfengshan 嵐峰山 [Misty Peak Mountain], my sense of 
this necropolis as an interconnected community has only grown stronger. The 
site includes over two hundred niches with numerous inscriptions dedicated by 
monks, nuns, laymen, and laywomen to deceased teachers and family 
members. These niches are mid-relief carvings in limestone rock-faces ranging 
across two mountains. Most are in the shape of small stūpas (reliquary towers, 
also known as pagodas) and are likely to have once held reliquary boxes for 
cremation ashes. Some of the memorials have a square cavity for a reliquary 
box carved below or beside the niche, and many of the identification 
inscriptions refer to the mortuary construction as a huishen ta 灰身塔, ‘ash-
                                                 
Wendi Adamek teaches in the Department of Indian Sub-Continental Studies at the 
University of Sydney. 
1 This paper draws from my forthcoming book, Practicescape: The Buddhists of Baoshan. 
Wendi Adamek 
 
Literature & Aesthetics 22 (2) December 2012 page 51 
remains stūpa.’ Several of the inscriptions describe the disciples cremating the 
body and gathering the remains. 
Many of the stūpa-shaped niches are elaborately carved, and may still 
contain remnants of statues representing the deceased. These statues are 
predominantly seated figures in the robes of monastics, and the robed bodies of 
nuns are portrayed no differently to those of monks. Prior to this, only 
buddhas, bodhisattvas,
2
 and idealised monks were portrayed in such stūpa-
shaped housings, whose closest stylistic counterparts can be seen at the 
Xiangtangshan 響堂山 caves in neighbouring Hebei. I have not yet found other 
medieval Chinese examples of stūpa-shaped niches containing statues of the 
deceased. Famously, Cave 285 of the Mogao 莫高 caves at Dunhuang 敦煌, 
constructed in 538-539, contains stūpa or cave-shaped niches with haloed 
images of meditating monks. However, these figures are archetypical and are 
not identified as representations of individuals. 
Reliquary stūpas were among the earliest Buddhist devotional 
                  li Mahāparinibbāna-sutta relates that after the cremation of 
the Buddha his relics were claimed by eight different groups, all of whom 
promised to build stūpas and hold festivals to honour them.
3
 Stūpas said to 
contain relics of the Buddha, his disciples, and later generations of revered 
monks and nuns eventually became destinations in pilgrimage circuits. As 
Buddhist scholar Gregory Schopen has pointed out, reliquary stūpas functioned 
as nodes in Buddhist networks, provided economic support for monks and 
nuns, and sometimes became the focus of violent contestation.
4
 However, early 
Buddhist reliquary stūpas did not include images. Until around the beginning 
of the Common Era, Buddhists eschewed anthropomorphic representations of 
the Buddha and his disciples in favour of symbols like the wheel of the 
Dharma, the Buddha’s footprint, the Buddha’s empty seat and, most 
                                                 
2 A no   on  onv n ion : a b dd a i  an ‘awak n d on ,’ and a bod i a  va i  on  w o  a  
generated the aspiration to become fully awakened and to become a buddha in order to aid 
o     b ing   Capi ali  d, ‘    B dd a’   f     o Sidd  rtha Gautama (c.490-410 BCE). 
Capi ali  d, ‘    D a ma’   f    to the teachings of Buddhism, to distinguish this from 
dharmas, the constituents of existence.  
3 Mahāparinibbāna-sutta, DN II. 166-7, in The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A 
Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya, trans. Maurice Walshe (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 
1995), pp. 231-77. 
4 G  go y S  op n, ‘    S pp    ion of N n  and     Ri  al M  d   of    i  Sp  ial D ad 
in  wo B dd i   Mona  i  Cod  ,’ in Buddhist Monks and Business Matters: Still More 
Papers on Monastic Buddhism in India (Honol l : Univ   i y of Hawai’i      , 2004), pp  
329-59. 
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importantly, the reliquary stūpa itself.
5
 
Even in this early period, the notion of merit was at the heart of 
Buddhist devotional activity. Early Buddhist scriptures such as the 
Dakkhiṇāvibhanga Sutta [The Exposition of Offerings] teach that offerings to 
the Buddha and to the community of the ordained gain merit for the devotee, 
which offsets the negative effects of past actions (karma) and helps create 
favorable future conditions in this life and the next.
6
 In traditional Buddhism, 
the most meritorious act was to become a monk, and the highest reward for 
merit was to be reborn as a monk and attain liberation from rebirth altogether. 
For laypeople, the most important of the merit-gaining activity was to support 
the community of monks and nuns. This support took many forms, including 
providing facilities and supplies, sponsoring vegetarian feasts and memorial 
services, providing the means for family members to become monks and nuns 
and, finally, the activities that render Baoshan’s practicescape visible to us 
now: sponsoring the copying and chanting of scriptures and dedicating votive 
and mortuary images and stūpas.  
Stūpa-building, merit-generation, and relic-veneration were key features 
of the legend of the first Buddhist ruler, King Aśoka (r.268-232 BCE). He was 
said to have collected the Buddha’s relics and built eighty-four thousand stūpas 
in order to distribute them more widely.
7
 When Buddhism spread to China in 
the early centuries of the Common Era, tales of the ruler’s pious fervour and 
the merit he accrued became sources of inspiration for Chinese Buddhist 
devotees. Moreover, it was believed that King Aśoka’s stūpa-building mission 
had extended beyond India, and therefore miracle-working relics of the Buddha 
could be discovered in China.
8
 Notably, King Aśoka was a role model for the 
Chinese Buddhist ruler Emperor Wen of the Sui 隨文帝 (r.581-604), who was 
a patron of the Baoshan founder Lingyu 靈裕 (518-605). The Chinese emperor 
instituted Buddha-relic distribution campaigns as a means of celebrating and 
                                                 
5       Ha v y, ‘V n  a  d Obj     and Symbol  of Ea ly B dd i m,’ in Symbols in Art and 
Religion: The Indian and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Karl Werner (London: Curzon, 
1990), pp. 68-102. 
6 Majjhima Nikāya III, 253-257, in The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New 
Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, trans. Bhikkhu N ṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi (Boston: 
Wisdom Publications, 1995), pp. 1102-1106. 
7 See John Strong, Relics of the Buddha (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 
124-149. 
8 Koi  i S ino a a, ‘ wo So      of C in    B dd i   Biog ap i  : Stupa Inscriptions and 
Mi a l  S o i  ,’ in Monks and Magicians: Religious Biographies in Asia, eds Phyllis 
Granoff and K. Shinohara (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1988), pp. 119-228.  
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consolidating his authority as a Buddhist monarch.
9
  
Stūpa-shaped housings for buddha images, relics, and sacred texts were 
common motifs of Chinese Buddhist art. Images and relics of the Buddha and 
the Buddhist scriptures represented, respectively, the Buddha and Dharma 
[Teachings] facets of the ‘Three Jewels’ or ‘Three Refuges.’ Representatives of 
the third facet, the Saṅgha or community of the ordained, also became objects 
of veneration, as seen in Mogao Cave 285 mentioned above. Disciples of the 
Buddha, eminent Indian monks, and soon also eminent Chinese monks were 
depicted in Chinese Buddhist art and literature.  
In Chinese Buddhist hagiographical works and miracle tales, the line 
between monks and nuns as exemplars and as sources of salvific power is not 
always easy to draw. These functions are woven together in the notion of 
‘refuge,’ because buddhas and bodhisattvas, Buddhist scriptures, and Buddhist 
disciples were all copied and petitioned. The pivotal role of the ordained as 
both models and mediators is reflected in Chinese Buddhist representations of 
monks and nuns, and also in scholarly debate as to the uses of such 
representations. References to veneration of images of deceased Chinese 
Buddhist masters appear in hagiographical works from the sixth century 
onwards. Sometimes these representations were also relics: lacquered 
mummies, or statues mixed with cremation ashes.
10
  
Notably, at Baoshan we see a significant precedent for the veneration of 
Buddhist masters. Along with large seated statues of the buddhas Vairocana, 
Amit bha, and Maitreya, Baoshan’s main cave-shrine contains the earliest 
known (589) representation of a lineal transmission from the Buddha through 
twenty-four Indian Dharma masters, who were later incorporated into the Chan 
transmission lineage.
11
 These shallow-relief carvings are not portraits and the 
Dharma masters are not buddhas, but they provide a precedent for associating 
buddha-images with images of Buddhist masters transmitting the Dharma. 
However, in order to understand why stūpa-enshrined representations of 
deceased Buddhist practitioners became a flourishing practice at Baoshan in 
                                                 
9 See Jinhua Chen, Monks and Monarchs, Kinship and Kingship: Tanqian in Sui Buddhism 
and Politics (Kyoto: Italian School of East Asian Studies, 2002). 
10 See Bernard Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy: A Cultural Critique of Chan/Zen 
Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991), pp. 148-178; Rob    S a f, ‘    
Idoliza ion of Enlig   nm n : On     M mmifi a ion of C 'an Ma      in M di val C ina,’ 
History of Religions, vol. 32 (August 1992), pp. 1-31; T. Griffith Foulk and Robert Sharf, 
‘On     Ri  al U   of C 'an  o   ai     in M di val C ina,’ in Chan Buddhism in Ritual 
Context, ed. Bernard Faure (London, Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 74-150; Wendi L. 
Adamek, The Mystique of Transmission: On an Early Chan Text and Its Contexts (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 254-276. 
11 Adamek, The Mystique of Transmission, pp. 101-110. 
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the sixth and seventh centuries, we need to take into account not only 
devotional practices but also regionally specific self-transformation practices. 
For this we must turn to the Eastern Wei 東魏 (534-550) and Northern Qi 北齊 
(550-577) dynasties, whose brief efflorescence provided lasting inspiration for 
Buddhist clerics and artisans, including the Baoshan founder Lingyu. 
Art historian Katherine Tsiang makes an intriguing surmise about links 
between image and practice, based on sculptural developments seen in the 
recently discovered Qingzhou 青州 sculptures in Shandong and the widely 
dispersed sculptures of the Xiangtangshan caves in Hebei, whose decorative 
motifs and stūpa niches were imitated at Baoshan. She suggests a connection 
between the sculpting of individualised buddha-images “in the round,” seated 
or standing, with the appearance of prayers for the donor and all beings to 
“become buddhas” (chengfo 成佛). In the middle of the sixth century in the 
Eastern Wei-Northern Qi area, this prayer and numerous variations (such as the 
wish to achieve enlightenment, cheng zhengjue 成正覺) proliferated. These 
prayers are seen in donor inscriptions dedicated by ordinary lay practitioners as 
well as clerics.
12
  
Tsiang further links these prayers with ordination rituals in which 
practitioners performed purification practices and received the bodhisattva 
precepts, which consecrated the devotee’s new identity as a bodhisattva, one on 
the path to buddhahood.
13
 This new identity was at the same time held to be a 
reflection of ultimate non-duality: one aspires to realisation of buddhahood 
because the matrix of one’s being cannot be anything other than buddha-
nature/interdependence. Of the graceful life-sized buddha sculptures found at 
Qingzhou, Tsiang writes:  
The approachable human quality of these sculptures appears on one 
level to represent the belief in the continuing presence of Buddha 
nature in this world. On another level, the individualised 
characteristics suggest that images might also have been made to 
represent aspiring devotees.
14
  
Born in 518, the Baoshan founder Lingyu matured during a brief period 
in which ultimate and mundane aspirations appeared to dovetail. However, by 
the time he designed the main devotional site at Baoshan, the whole region had 
undergone invasion and subsequent persecution of Buddhism under the 
Northern Zhou 北周 (557-581). Subsequently, with a new Buddhist mandate 
                                                 
12 Ka    in  R    iang, ‘R  olv   o B  om  a B dd a (Chengfo) – Changing Aspirations 
and Imagery in Sixth C n   y C in    B dd i m,’ Early Medieval China, vol. 13-14, no. 2 
(2008), pp. 115-169. 
13   iang, ‘R  olv   o B  om  a B dd a (Chengfo),’ p  167  
14   iang, ‘R  olv   o B  om  a B dd a (Chengfo),’ pp  148-149. 
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under Emperor Wen of the Sui and reunification of the empire after several 
centuries of division, Northern and Southern Buddhist exegetes were 
attempting to find common ground. Lingyu’s practice program amplifies both 
the renewed fervour and the eschatological anxieties of his times.  
Building on Tsiang’s argument about connections between sixth-century 
buddha images and prayers, I suggest that Baoshan’s seventh-century images 
and memorials were intended to carry on the work of representing buddha-
nature and transmission of the Dharma in human form. In the following 
sections we examine selected Baoshan images and inscriptions in order to 
elucidate various facets of this work, which ultimately reshaped the faces of 
two mountains. 
 
The Work of Memorialisation 
The earliest datable memorial niche on Baoshan is dedicated to Dharma Master 
Fadeng 法澄 (BS 61).15 The stūpa-shaped niche is simply carved; the figure 
sits in meditation posture wearing a clinging Indian-style robe with pleated 
folds across the front. The inscription states: “Caitya (reliquary) stūpa of the 
late monk, Dharma Master Fadeng. Recorded in the first month of the ninth 
year of the Kaixing 開皇 era (589).” This is the year that the main cave-temple 
was dedicated, and also the year that the Emperor Wen of the Sui reunified 
China.  
A stūpa niche in a similar style on another part of the mountain, 
dedicated about a year later, has a figure with a halo (BS 3).
16
 The inscription 
reads: “Caitya stūpa of Dharma Master Daozheng 道政. Constructed on the 
fifteenth day of the first month of the gengxu 庚戌 tenth year (590) of the 開皇 
Kaihuang era of the Great Sui.” There does not appear to be another niche with 
a haloed figure of the deceased, though there may once have been more; many 
niches have been defaced and their images removed. The figure of Daozheng is 
seated with his hands placed on a small table in a manner suggestive of writing. 
This is the most frequently portrayed attitude throughout the site, for both 
monks and nuns. The image of the monk or nun caught in the act of writing 
                                                 
15 Niches are identified according to the numbers given in the catalogue Baoshan Lingquan 
si 寶山靈泉寺 [Lingquan Temple at Baoshan], ed. Henansheng gudai jianzhu baohu 
yanjiusuo 河南省古代建築保護研究所 [Henan Research Institute for the Preservation of 
Ancient Architecture], (Zhengzhou: Henan Renmin, 1991). I adopted this numbering system 
for my own catalogue and translations. BS = Baoshan, LFS = Lanfengshan. BS 61 is found 
in Henan Research Institute for the Preservation of Ancient Architecture, Baoshan Lingquan 
si, pp. 169, 355. 
16 BS 3 is found in Henan Research Institute for the Preservation of Ancient Architecture, 
Baoshan Lingquan si, pp. 170, 355. 
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conveys the practice of copying scripture. Other statues are portrayed doing 
other kinds of practice: meditation, as in the first example, and holding a 
rosary, which is a visual reference for reciting buddha names. All of these 
practices are considered to generate merit in perpetuity. 
Few of the remaining figures have faces, having fallen prey to 
vandalism or the illegal trade in antiquities. However, on Lanfengshan, the 
neighbouring mountain where the niches for nuns and laywomen are carved, 
several figures retain faces of startling detail and individualisation. 
Nevertheless, these examples of verisimilitude cannot be assumed to be 
likenesses of actual people without supporting evidence. 
 
 
Figure 1: LFS 34A. Dharma Master Faguang 法光, nun. Photo credit: 
Frederick M. Smith 
 
Fortunately, corroboration that likeness was desired is found in five of 
the inscriptions, though unfortunately none of the corresponding images have 
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been left with faces intact. Disciples who commissioned and dedicated these 
niches for their masters include the following phrases in their descriptions of 
the image-making process. Listed in chronological order, the first two 
references are to nuns: Dhy na Master Sengshun 僧順 (555-639), nun, kanshi 
tuxing 刊石圖形 “carved the stone and traced her form;” Dharma Master 
Puxiang 普相 (566-643), nun, xie shenyi 寫神儀 “depicted her supernal 
appearance;” Dharma Master Huijing 慧靜 (573-641), tuxing 圖形 “traced his 
form” and tuxing huaxiang 圖形畫像 “traced his form and drew his portrait;” 
BS 106,
17
 Dharma Master Zhan 瞻 (644-686), shitu yingxiang 式圖影像 
“modelled and traced his portrait;” BS 110,
18
 Master (name illegible) (d. 723), 
tu yixiang 圖儀像 “traced his likeness.” 
Let us examine more closely the most detailed of these inscriptions, the 
one for Dharma Master Huijing (LFS 25).
19
 Carved on a separate cliff of 
Lanfengshan, away from the niches for nuns and laywomen, Huijing’s large 
but rather crudely carved stūpa is paired with the elaborate stūpa of his more 
famous fellow monk, Dharma Master Huixiu 慧休 (547-646). Like many of 
these images, he is depicted with a small writing table. 
At the end of the biographical part of the inscription, the disciple who 
dedicated the stūpa describes his feelings and his filial respect for his teacher:  
I, his disciple Fayan 法演, was from a young age favoured with his 
instruction and guidance, and [thanks to him] have been fortunate in 
achieving a position in life. I “climb the wooded hill” (i.e. yearn for 
him as for a father), carrying my gratitude. To show the extent of my 
sincere filial piety, I have cremated the bone fragments and have 
respectfully taken up the numinous ashes. I have had a mountain 
pillar sculpted, traced his form (tuxing 圖形) and erected a stūpa, and 
I have inscribed all his noble deeds. I entrust to the carving on the 
mountain [the memory of] his great virtues and exemplary services, 
so that they will be transmitted imperishably.
20
 
Then, in the eulogistic second part of the inscription, he says: 
I have not reached the other shore, and he suddenly took leave of the 
human world. Moved by feelings of filiality and sincerity, I have 
traced his form and drawn his portrait (tuxing huaxiang 圖形畫像). I 
                                                 
17 BS 106 is found in Henan Research Institute for the Preservation of Ancient Architecture, 
Baoshan Lingquan si, pp. 185, 362. 
18 BS 110 is found in Henan Research Institute for the Preservation of Ancient Architecture, 
Baoshan Lingquan si, p. 364. 
19 LFS 25 is found in Henan Research Institute for the Preservation of Ancient Architecture, 
Baoshan Lingquan si, pp. 213, 330.  
20 My translation from in situ inscription. 
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crave an audience with his supernal appearance (shenyi 神儀) when I 
come to pay my respects. The mountain is empty and the valley still, 
the pines are vigorous and the wind is [fresh?]. I have engraved [this 
inscription] amid these majestic peaks to forever proclaim his 
illustrious name.
21
 
In the memorial, the monk Fayan expresses a desire for ‘an audience’ with his 
master when he visits the stūpa. Is this a rhetorical performance or 
performative rhetoric, and can these aspects be separated? Is a public 
demonstration of filial piety, which is a form of raising symbolic capital, 
absolutely antithetical to inscribing words in order to evoke the effect 
described – in other words, to come into contact with the deceased? Rather 
than resorting to the reductive exercise of linking Fayan’s act with a strategic 
purpose like the claim to social status by association, let us consider instead the 
more complex ‘agency of relations’ at work here.  
By ‘agency of relations’ I do not mean simply the power of collective 
action, but the way that each representation – textual, visual, or reflexive – 
emerges out of many intersecting processes of interaction, construction, 
intention, and action, and in turn has effects within these processes. This entails 
a broad definition of agency as the capacity to generate effects and be affected 
within a given field of conditions. In this view, the capacity to act as a self-
reflective agent is itself an effect of the agency of relations. (The issue of 
intentionality will be taken up in the next section.) This model is drawn from 
the foundational Buddhist teaching that the experience of the agency of a ‘self’ 
is an effect of ongoing cyclic processes (interaction, construction, intention, 
interaction) rather than the property of a self-moving thing or immutable 
essence. Thus, by looking into the intersecting aesthetic, social, and 
soteriological constructs that co-produced Baoshan as a matrix of 
interdependent and interconnecting agency, we engage in practices that have 
Buddhist analogues.   
In the field of conditions in which the monastics and artisans of Baoshan 
worked together, it is illuminating to look into the interface between the 
popular Buddhist soteriology of merit production, mentioned above, and elite 
aesthetics. Long standing Chinese aesthetic principles celebrated the artist’s 
power of tapping into the efficacy or responsiveness of things, over the artist’s 
power of individual creativity or technical virtuosity. Though the phrases used 
in the inscriptions refer to processes of making a likeness, resemblance was not 
an end in itself but a means of activating a connection with the inner qualities 
of the subject. This is articulated in a passage from the ninth century Lidai 
minghua ji 歷代名畫記 [Record of Famous Paintings Through the Ages]: 
                                                 
21 My translation from in situ inscription. 
Wendi Adamek 
 
Literature & Aesthetics 22 (2) December 2012 page 59 
Ancient paintings could pass down the semblance [of the subject] 
and its inner nature, seeking to depict it with what is beyond 
semblance; this is very difficult to explain to an ordinary person. 
Present-day paintings achieve semblance, but they don’t produce 
qiyun 氣韻 [vital-energy tone]. If they sought to depict it with qiyun, 
then the semblance would be there in its midst.
22
  
Behind the aesthetics of capturing vital essence was the metaphysics of 
correlation. The notion of sympathetic resonance (ganying 感應) held that like 
things spoke to like. The mutually resonating correspondences of physical 
bodies, artistic representations, and natural phenomena are their key qualities; 
understood relationally. Metaphors of sound and tuning were used to convey 
this; the yun in qiyun is the word for rhyme and tone.  
 
Ekphrasis and the Correspondence of Things  
This aesthetic metaphysics can be usefully compared to the notion of 
ekphrasis. As a technical term in the Greek practice of rhetoric, it referred to 
descriptions so vivid as to bring an image or even an emotional experience of 
the subject to the hearer.
23
 This appears to have had a performative aspect, 
evoking an object by calling its name. And, as Robert Buch elaborates, the 
magical power of ekphrasis to absorb the audience, to the point of self-
forgetfulness, into visualised contact with the subject was coupled with the 
antithetical desire to draw attention to itself: “The ekphrastic is thus based on 
conflicting aspirations: the self-effacement of the medium and the 
demonstration and exposure of its power, the semblance of transparence, on the 
one hand, and self-reflexivity, on the other.”
24
   
At Baoshan, those who commissioned the memorials called on 
inanimate objects, the stones of the mountain, by the names of their closest 
Dharma and blood relations. The agency or mediumship of the memorials 
increased in proportion to the inspirational and artistic merit of their references 
to the life-works that they enshrined. The most formal (and expensive) type of 
memorial began with a description of the deceased’s family, meritorious 
endeavours, and character, and ended with eulogistic verses addressed to 
                                                 
22 Zhang Yanyuan 張彥遠, Lidai minghua ji 歷代名畫記 [Record of Famous Paintings 
Through the Age]), fascicle 1, p. 22, compiled in 847, SKQS fascicle 812, p. 289. SKQS = 
Siku quanshu 四庫全書 [Complete Imperial Library of the Four Treasuries], eds. Ji Yun 
紀昀 and Lu Xixiong 陸錫熊 et al., compiled 1773-1782, reproduced digitally by the 
Chinese University of Hong Kong & Digital Heritage Publishing Ltd., 1999. 
23 R    W bb, ‘Ekp  a i ,’ in Grove Art Online. Oxford Art Online, at: 
http://www.oxfordartonline.com/subscriber/article/grove/art/T025773. Accessed 7/09/2012. 
24 Robert Buch, The Pathos of the Real: On the Aesthetics of Violence in the Twentieth 
Century (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 2010), p. 119. 
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present and future audiences. 
Eulogies frequently drew attention to the subject and the eulogist’s 
efforts to commemorate him or her by calling attention to the representation of 
the subject; this in fact generated a separate genre, the “portrait eulogy” 
(zhenzan 真讚, xiangzan 像讚).25 As an example, the Baoshan eulogy for 
Dharma Master Linghui 靈慧 (d.716, BS 109)26 acts like a portrait-eulogy. In 
the first verse the representation is found wanting: “Even with a skilled artisan, 
the reality is still difficult to judge.” In the third verse, the stone representation 
itself is the subject: “Above he relies on the marvellous mountain, below he 
gazes down at the numinous spring.” Poignantly, the eulogy is worn and full of 
lacunae, and the final words are lost: “With no regret …” To echo Jacques 
Derrida, the semblance is successful insofar as it cannot succeed – its failure to 
be the subject is its substance, its effective work of mourning.
27
  
However, it is not the abiding essence of the subject that the Buddhist 
eulogist hopes to evoke and contact. The eulogised master, the realised subject, 
is venerated as one who has gone beyond the delusion of essence or non-
essence, being or non-being. According to basic Buddhist teachings, the 
realisation that all apparent things arise co-dependently, lacking any 
independent basis, is the key to realising the fundamental emptiness of 
apparent phenomena and thus becoming free from the delusions and 
attachments that lead to suffering, death, and rebirth. The deceased masters 
represent this successful transformation, and representations of these ‘special 
dead’ enact the presence of this transformation in the world. 
Yet this Buddhist representation of ‘form that is no-form’ remains 
distinct from the Platonic theory of ideal forms that lends a metaphysical 
dimension to the notion of ekphrasis. In that context, the relatedness of things 
is their shared imperfect reference to the perfect form that they copy. 
Paradoxically, mimetic removes, or representations of representations, are 
more revelatory of reality, not less, because their relationality reveals their 
common reference to their transcendent form. However, in a manner that 
sometimes appears to echo Buddhist or Daoist dialectics, in the Sophist it is the 
transcendent coinherence of being and difference that appears as the only 
relation of all. The apparent paradox of the one in the many is first introduced 
as a deliberate manipulation: the Eleatic Stranger decries the sophist’s ability to 
claim ‘the idea’ as his subject; the idea that is “the common notion pervading 
                                                 
25 Adamek, The Mystique of Transmission, pp. 254-276. 
26 BS 109 is found in Henan Research Institute for the Preservation of Ancient Architecture, 
Baoshan Lingquan si, pp. 187, 363. 
27 Jacques Derrida, The Work of Mourning, eds. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2001), pp. 139-164. 
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all these objects, which you speak of as many, and yet call by the single name 
of image, as though it were the unity under which they were all included.”
28
 On 
the contrary, the only reality of the image is that it is ‘really unreal;’ instead the 
Stranger suggests that “my notion would be, that anything which possesses any 
sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another, if only for a single 
moment, however trifling the cause and however slight the effect, has real 
existence; and I hold that the definition of being is simply power.”
29
  
However satisfying this reductive proposition of being as agency may 
appear, the Stranger and his interlocutor reluctantly realise that it affords no 
ground for distinguishing between being as the perfect immutable and the 
dependent fluctuations of becoming.
30
 As exemplified in the practice of 
ekphrasis, the mimetic arts have precisely this power to affect yet they are 
without ‘real existence.’  
Being is then proposed as a combination of active and passive, or 
movement and rest, but this unity achieved through the confluence of opposites 
is admitted to be inadmissible. It is then proposed that while the communion of 
all with all, and none with none, have been refuted, a third proposition yet 
remains, that of the communication of some with some. To discover the 
principles behind this diverse yet ordered communion is the dialectical art of 
the philosopher, distinct from the rhetorical arts of the sophist. The Stranger 
claims: “he who can divide rightly is able to see clearly one form pervading a 
scattered multitude, and many different forms contained under one higher 
form; and again, one form knit together into a single whole and pervading 
many such wholes, and many forms, existing only in separation and 
isolation.”
31
 In seeking to articulate the underlying principles of these relations 
it is discovered that, in contravention of the law of “the father,” Parmenides, 
“we have shown what form of being not-being is; for we have shown that the 
nature of the other is, and is distributed over all things in their relations to one 
another, and whatever part of the other is contrasted with being, this is 
precisely what we have ventured to call not-being.”
32
  
What is held to be irrefutable is that “being, and difference or other, 
traverse all things and mutually interpenetrate, so that the other partakes of 
being, and by reason of this participation is, and yet is not that of which is 
partakes, but other, and being other than being, it is clearly a necessity that not-
                                                 
28  la o, ‘    Sop i  ,’ in The Dialogues of Plato, 2nd ed., trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1892), Vol. 4, p. 368. 
29  la o, ‘The Sop i  ,’ pp. 378-379. 
30  la o, ‘    Sop i  ,’ pp. 380-381. 
31  la o, ‘    Sop i  ,’ p. 386. 
32  la o, ‘    Sop i  ,’ p. 393-394. 
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being should be.”
33
 The emergence of things from the derivative medium of 
language, in which this appears to be a contradiction, is the basis of the false 
arts of the sophist, while the emergence of things in nature from relative non-
being, and even the natural emergence of visual illusions, are held to be the 
true art of the divine.
34
 
Although Buddhists also employ dialectics to reveal the overarching co-
dependence of being and non-being, it is in service of revealing these as 
constructs of the ordinary mind, not the divine mind. In a Buddhist context, the 
correspondence of things at a remove is a way to point to lack of essence or 
self-moving movers. It is not that a carved image of X eulogised in verse points 
to something ineffable that remains ineluctably X. Rather, representation of 
representation points to the way that the agency of relations acts to presence 
‘X.’ Alive or dead, one is a unique virtual subject appearing in the relations 
through which one is constituted. 
‘Craving an audience,’ did the disciple Fayan want the ghost of his 
master Huijing to appear before him on the mountainside? On the contrary 
ghosts were considered a form of negative karmic static that it required much 
transferred merit to transform.
35
 Instead, one could compare these formulaic 
eulogies to tuning instruments, skilful means of establishing resonance 
between the merit of devotion to the deceased and the merit of the deceased. 
The most basic means to generate merit was to make pious donations, and 
making these memorial niches was considered to be a form of pious donation 
as well as a form of spiritual filial piety. Merit was the mirror or the resonating 
‘tone,’ both the form and the medium of spiritual relationship.  
 
The Work of Practicescape 
The ‘mortuary grove’ (talin 塔林) on Baoshan was intended as a merit-field 
that would grow and extend beneficial relations. It was a work in progress from 
the sixth century onwards, when Baoshan began to be developed as a place of 
practice, a bodhimaṇḍa. The marriage of a ritually and/or geographically 
bounded space with a soteriological motivation creates a bodhimaṇḍa. Energy 
and resources devoted to transformation of a physical location are invested in 
an ideology, the desire to ‘save beings’ by converting them to Buddhism. 
Buddhist records and hagiographies are filled with stories of the agency of 
nonhumans – animals, deities, and even stones – who are bound to particular 
places, convert to Buddhism, and become part of the community. 
                                                 
33  la o, ‘    Sop i  ,’ p. 394. 
34  la o, ‘    Sop i  ,’ pp. 403-404. 
35 See Stephen Teiser, The Ghost Festival in Medieval China (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988). 
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The term ‘practicescape’ is derived from combining the Buddhist notion 
of bodhimaṇḍa with anthropologist Timothy Ingold’s notion of ‘taskscape.’ In 
the The Perception of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling, Skill, 
Ingold says: “It is to the entire ensemble of tasks, in their mutual interlocking, 
that I refer by the concept of taskscape. Just as the landscape is an array of 
related features, so – by analogy – the taskscape is an array of related activities. 
And as with the landscape, it is qualitative and heterogeneous: we can ask of a 
taskscape, as of a landscape, what it is like, but not how much of it there is.”
36
  
Of ‘practicescape’ we also ask what it is like, but cannot say how much 
of it there is. The Baoshan practicescape is an interlocking of related activities: 
the desire to escape from suffering, modifications of the landscape over time 
through practice of an ensemble of tasks that were understood as skilful means 
to aid other beings, and a dwelling-place for those practicing ‘non-abiding.’ 
The name of the main devotional cave, Dazhusheng 大住聖, means ‘Great 
Abiding Holy Ones,’ referring to the above-mentioned images of buddhas, 
bodhisattvas and Dharma masters carved on the walls. In order to enable 
  ali a ion of ‘non-abiding’,        id n  ’ continual work on the social 
relations of human and non-human actors (including the deceased and the 
buddhas) were intended to reproduce and expand the merit field from 
generation to generation. 
The practice of transforming a mountain into a field of responsive 
images and the practice of transforming a ‘self’ into realisation of buddha-
nature both involve a shift in intention and skill away from the agency of 
actors, toward the agency of relations. In Reassembling the Social, Bruno 
Latour, paraphrasing Gilles Deleuze, works with the principle that “relativism 
is not the relativity of truth but the truth of relations.”
37
 He argues for the 
importance of tracing the associations and unexamined assumptions that bind 
together heterogeneous elements, as a means of de-naturalising reified 
constructs like ‘the social.’ This process, I suggest, is similar to contemplative 
means used in some forms of Buddhist practice to de-naturalise reified notions 
like ‘the self,’ or subject versus object. However, the crucial difference 
between any Buddhist ‘truth of relations’ and Latour’s is that the intentionality 
of the virtual subject is the key pivot in a Buddhist understanding of the agency 
of relations. The idea of the karmic effect of intentional action, including 
merit-oriented action, is itself a powerful agent. From one perspective we could 
see this idea as a network effect; from another we could see it as putting into 
                                                 
36 Timothy Ingold, The Perception of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling, and 
Skill (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 195. 
37 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 95 note. 
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effect each provisional agent’s capacity to see it as such, and act accordingly 
(morally). 
Though there is this critical difference, Latour’s work does help shed 
light on the workings of soteriological intention within Baoshan’s assemblage 
of human and non-human ‘actants.’ Latour uses the term ‘actant’ to capture the 
agency and morphism of hypostasised entities that include but are not limited 
to human individuals: things like environments, objects, corporations, and 
‘Buddhism’ are ‘actants.’ Their shapes and functions emerge from the web of 
relations.
38
  
Moreover, special entities that help direct and exchange flows from one 
node of relational agency to another are termed ‘mediators.’ These may be 
human-made things like ideas and computers, but they also may be natural 
objects that assume special functions, or shaped natural objects, like the cliffs 
of Baoshan. They play a role in continually re-translating and reassembling 
their contexts/conditions. They are shaped by us in such a way that they have 
the power to shape us in turn, often in unforeseen ways.
39
 In contrast to mere 
intermediaries that do not alter what they convey, mediators are pivotal ‘black 
boxes’ translating input into effects that cannot be precisely matched with 
chartable causes.  
The carved stones of Baoshan’s crowded necropolis are engaged in 
these processes of mediating devotional activity, generating social 
differentiation and reassembling the practicescape. At the same time, their 
interactively constituted agency and functions are reified as the ‘merit field’ 
and the ‘lonely mountainside.’ Reification of assemblages (‘punctualisation’) is 
integral to our daily taskscape, but Latour is not asking us to get rid of these 
basic building blocks of our lived worlds, only to see them for what they are. 
Importantly, one of the ways that the ‘truth of relations’ disappears is when a 
bird’s eye view is projected from a process that is actually more like an ant’s, 
running into rocks and ideas in non-repeatable sequences and trajectories. If we 
reverse trails and ground we glimpse the unchartable web of relations upon 
which this business depends.  
Though not oriented toward ultimate liberation like the Buddhist 
critique of conceptual illusions, Latour’s critique of sociological illusions does 
have broader implications. It is both a diagnosis and a prescription. 
Investigation into the associations of functions brings attention to the processes 
of reconstruction and projection in which we are continually engaged. This is 
not simply ‘theory’ – which is also a punctualised hybrid deriving its agency 
from our agonistic relations with it. It is clear that Latour, like a good Buddhist, 
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39 Latour, Reassembling the Social, pp. 63-86; 232-241. 
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feels that the failure to recognise the true nature/emptiness of our constructions 
causes unnecessary suffering. 
Daringly, Latour asks: “Can sociology become empirical in the sense of 
respecting the strange nature of what is ‘given into experience’?”
40
 He presents 
the following challenge to the sociologist while admitting that it may be 
beyond the realm of sociology: “We have to let out of their cages entities 
which had been strictly forbidden to enter the scene until now and allow them 
to roam the world again. What name could I give them? Entities, beings, 
objects, things, perhaps refer to them as invisibles. To deploy the different 
ways in which they assemble the collective would require an entirely different 
book… ”
41
  
Latour might not be willing to characterise the ontology of the kind of 
invisibles and entities evoked in the inscriptions and images at Baoshan, but he 
would affirm their agency in assembling the collective. Importantly, the 
collective is not ‘the social’ – that hypostatisation is precisely the cramped 
cage from which he desires to free them. Rather, the collective is both the 
charted and the uncharted web of associations that gives us experience and 
gives us to experience. What is uncharted he terms ‘plasma’ or ‘the missing 
masses.’ Plasma is “in between and not made of social stuff,” it is the “vast 
ocean of uncertainties speckled by a few islands of calibrated and stabilised 
forms.”
42
  
With reference to the tiny Buddhist island that is Baoshan and the tiny 
island that is the self, ‘the agency of relations’ refers to the mapped (calibrated 
and stabilised) and unmapped webs of association and effect as the emergent 
matrix of ongoing practice and experience. The tiny island of the construct 
‘self-in-world’ appears vast because we learn to channel so much of our energy 
to unconsciously maintaining, repairing, and carrying it with us, while the 
ocean of indeterminable agency remains, to greater or lesser degrees, invisible. 
The island of Baoshan, however, is constructed on the belief that the ocean can 
be seen.    
The pivotal unfathomable agency in between construction and 
deconstruction is also integral to Andrew Pickering’s exploration of “the 
reciprocal production of science, technology, and society.”
43
 In The Mangle of 
Practice: Time, Agency, and Science, he takes up Latour’s presentation of 
‘plasma’: “One can start from the idea that the world is filled not, in the first 
                                                 
40 Latour, Reassembling the Social, p. 236. 
41 Latour, Reassembling the Social, p. 240. 
42 Latour, Reassembling the Social, pp. 244-245. 
43 Andrew Pickering, The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 1. 
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instance, with facts and observations, but with agency.”
44
 
However, to avoid Latour’s recourse to semiotics as a means of 
analogising the agency of human and nonhuman (i.e. as ‘representations’), and 
to avoid a narrow performative approach that relates all agency to the sphere of 
‘the social,’ Pickering proposes that we “think carefully about time.”
45
 The 
wholesale (or as Latour might say, ‘uncaged’) performative agency of material 
things can be taken seriously if we see the contours of material agency as 
temporally emergent in practice, in relation to human agency.  
Pickering is focused on the practicescape of scientific work. However, I 
argue that there is analogous co-dependent human and nonhuman agency in the 
performative emergence of soteriological work, and this can also be seen more 
clearly through attention to time. Time is the arrival and generation of 
feedback, the great ongoing punctualisation and mediator of uncertainty. 
Humans know material agency through our work on time as much as through 
its work on us. Pickering points out that human agents relating as scientists to 
nonhuman material agents are continually exploring the responses of material 
agency, engaging in “delicate material positioning or tuning”
46
 for signals. The 
human does something, a material response occurs, which causes the human to 
tune her actions in response, and so on – all the way to laptops and iPhones.  
It is important to note that technologies of material transformation and 
technologies of self-transformation share the quality of intentional focus on the 
feedback process itself. Furthermore, analogous intentional focus is given to 
the mutual effects of the interaction of human and nonhuman, i.e. the 
resonance and agency of their relations. The difference, of course, is that 
technologies of material transformation are based precisely on the attempt to 
exclude immaterial and indeterminable agents and effects. Yet technology 
depends on those most slippery and wilful of immaterial actants, marketable 
‘ideas.’ And these ideas have enabled the market to extend so far into the realm 
of intangibles that interactive effects ricochet around the globe with ever 
greater intensity and speed. Perhaps our objection to older immaterial and 
indeterminable agents like gods and buddhas is not so much that they refuse to 
be seen, but that they refuse to be seen outside their niches, that is, outside of 
relationships of face-to-face mutual effect.  
Though one would not want to erase the difference between material 
and immaterial mediators, it is also important to see the analogous functioning 
that blurs their boundaries. For both kinds of mediators, effects are temporally 
emergent, their structures can be repeated (but not necessarily their effects), 
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45 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, p. 14. 
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and they are mutually constitutive. It is in the “real time of practice”
47
 and 
relationship that the agency of each emerges.  
Significantly, however, Pickering notes that human intentionality 
“appears to have no counterpart in the material realm.”
48
 Yet there are parallels 
in the ‘intentional structure’ of human and material agency. Human 
intentionality is always-already shaped by prior acting-in-response to material 
agency. “The world of intentionality is, then, constitutively engaged with the 
world of material agency, even if the one cannot be substituted for the other.”
49
 
This happens to be a fairly good description of the way karma is 
understood to work. Intention is the threshold of agency that marks an action 
with particular qualities, qualities that will in turn mark the temporally 
emergent assemblage that is taken as ‘the self.’ Early Buddhist contemplative 
practice is founded on the notion that becoming aware of the moment-by-
moment processes of assemblage is the first step in breaking out of the cage of 
subjectifying that process. Buddhist practitioners developed a complex science 
and ethics of perceptual and conceptual illusion. Much work was devoted to 
describing the source and functioning of the subject/object delusion and 
detailing the existential and moral consequences. Buddhist practice involves 
the deconstruction, both conceptual and contemplative, of the habits of 
reification, in order to see through our ongoing co-dependent construction.  
Nevertheless, however many mediating translators are generated, 
Buddhist deconstruction and network theory cannot either assimilate or be 
assimilated by its ‘Western’ counterparts. In contrast to Derrida’s presencing of 
irresolvable paradoxes,
50
 Buddhists claim that it is possible to experience self-
presence as no-presence, without medium, ‘trace,’ distinction, or deferment. In 
contrast to Bourdieu’s notion of habitus,
51
 it is believed the practitioner can 
reshape bodily dispositions in order to completely dissolve identification with 
dispositions. In contrast to Pickering’s attention to time as a means of 
recognising material agency, Buddhist attention to time is in order to recognise 
it as our construct. In spite of Latour’s call to let forbidden entities out of their 
cages, it is doubtful that he would ever characterise this is the call of a buddha. 
 
 
                                                 
47 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, p. 16. 
48 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, p. 18.  
49 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, p. 20. 
50 Exploring yet resisting the desire to resolve aporia is characteristic of many of Derrida’  
works; one well-known example is Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1994). 
51 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). 
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The Work of the Practitioner 
Carved on the outside rock-face of Dazhusheng cave at Baoshan, there is a 
liturgical text that Lingyu probably intended as a script for in situ practice of a 
repentance ritual of buddha-naming recitations. Known as the Lue li qijie 
foming chanhui deng wen 略禮七階佛名懺悔等文 [The Text of the Abridged 
Repentance for Venerating the Buddha Names of the Seven Registers, 
hereafter Chanhui wen], the text proceeds through recitations of homage to 
buddhas of the ten directions, the seven buddhas of the past, the fifty-three 
buddhas, the thousand buddhas, the thirty-five buddhas, innumerable buddhas, 
and buddhas of past, present, and future. It then proceeds to a vow of refuge 
and repentance for all types of offences, beginning with the phrase: “In this 
way may all the Buddhas, the World-Honoured Ones, who constantly reside in 
the world, may these World Honoured Ones compassionately be mindful of 
me.”
52
 When the many types of offences have been covered, the petitioner 
concludes: “Now all the Buddhas, the World-Honoured Ones, should bear 
witness to and know me; should recall and hold me in mind.” The petitioner 
then asks that any merit gained be transferred to “supreme ultimate 
enlightenment.”
53
  
Lingyu is also said to be the author of a prayer or didactic verse that 
provides a step-by-step explanation of the spiritual physics of repentance.
54
 
According to his verses, if one is able to realise and render apparent one’s 
transgressions through sincere repentance, one’s own pure nature innately 
responds to the mind of the buddhas. The responsive compassion of the 
buddhas then eliminates ‘defilements’ (Skt. kleśas), the habitual unwholesome 
delusory patterns or addictions that keep one in bondage. The elimination of 
these obscuring patterns of behaviour then removes the errors of perception 
that are the only barrier to enlightenment and the ultimate buddha-realm, which 
is the recognition of the co-dependent nature of the arising of phenomena, 
which have no independent basis. In other words, this is the agency of relations 
and the capacity to realise it as such. 
Lingyu’s writing and his design of Dazhusheng cave were both 
                                                 
52 Bruce Charles Williams, Mea Maxima Vikalpa: Repentance, Meditation, and the 
Dynamics of Liberation in Medieval Chinese Buddhism, 500-650 CE (Ph.D. diss., 
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influenced by his background in the Dilun 地論 or ‘Stages Treatise’ school, a 
form of phenomenology. Dilun monks active in Ye during the Northern Qi 
developed a rather concrete notion of what it meant to achieve buddhahood.
55
 
Dilun exegetes participated in an ongoing Buddhist debate about the 
relationship between tathāgatagarba (innate potential buddha-nature) and 
Yog c ra notions of an absolutely pure fundamental consciousness 
(ālayavijñāna). Elimination of defilements became a key focus of practice, as 
removal of accrued negative patterns of thought and action allowed one’s 
fundamental affinity/identity with buddha-nature to be actualised.  
Abandoning the technical language of Yog c ra scriptures, Lingyu’s 
verses provide images of physical processes like mirroring, resonance, and 
catalysis in order to guide practitioners. He evokes the emergence of the 
tortures of hell out of toxic emotions as if this were a natural process rather 
than a mandated punishment. He then describes the mind’s gradual purification 
following the mutually responsive mirror-like awareness generated in 
repentance.  
Similarly, his fellow-monk Tanqian 曇遷 (542-607) also wrote a 
repentance poem, the Shie chanwen 十惡懺文 (Text of Repentance for the Ten 
Evil Deeds)
56
 and in it he uses an alchemical image to express the sudden 
catalyzing effect of repentance:  
From beginningless time the ten unwholesome acts are all produced 
from the perverted perspective of kleśas. Now, because of relying on 
the strength of the true perspective of buddha-nature, I confess and 
repent and [my transgressions] are thereby extirpated. It is like a 
bright pearl thrown into turbid water; through the power and virtue 
of the pearl the water immediately becomes transparent. The power 
and virtue of buddha-nature is just like this.
57
 
For Lingyu, repentance transformed the turbulence of the mind into resonant 
identity between reflective mind and reflective buddha-mind. This individual 
phenomenological resonance was also meant to be realised in the field of 
collective practice. Like the opening up and clearing of the mind in repentance, 
the generous expenditure of one’s limited physical and material resources 
would bring one into correspondence with the inexhaustible merit-field of the 
buddhas, in a virtuous/virtual feedback loop. 
Moreover, correspondence with the inexhaustible merit-field was 
considered to enable the manifestation of ‘merit bodies,’ including ‘pure 
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lands,’ which were trans-mundane practicescapes. We see this in an evocation 
of the workings of practicescape by the Dilun exegete Huiyuan 慧遠 (523-
592), Lingyu’s contemporary. He writes of the mutually constitutive and 
responsive nature of body, intention, and material field:  
It is because of transformation (hua 化) that the differentiations are 
inconsistent. If there is land [of a certain nature] there follows body 
[of a certain nature]. For example, before Amitabha became a 
buddha his land (guotu 國土) was coarse and uncouth, but after he 
became a buddha his realm (guojie 國界) was magnificent and pure. 
The locations that other buddhas manifest are indeterminate in their 
conditions (buding jinggu 不定境故). It is all like this: if there is a 
body [of a certain nature] there follows a land [of a certain nature].
58
 
In this passage we see the principles of mutually responsive resonance wedded 
to the soteriological aim of creating practicescapes, worlds “magnificent and 
pure,” through which devotees could achieve ultimate enlightenment. In this 
way the individual agency of the practitioner is preserved – he or she still must 
practice in order to achieve awakening. At the same time, the efficacy of the 
merit-bodies and merit-practicescapes of the buddhas and bodhisattvas, a 
Buddhist version of ‘grace,’ is explained as a natural phenomenon. The agency 
of relations allows for the mutual work of natural and intentional effect without 
subordinating one to the other.   
 
Conclusion 
I have explored the agency of relations in three modes: the work of 
memorialisation, the work of practicescape, and the work of the practitioner. 
At Baoshan, the work of memorialisation was meant to actualise reciprocal 
merit by speaking to the image; its making, and its subject. The work of 
practicescape was meant to break down the disposition to objectify fields of 
practice (like the self) as things, and to restore awareness of the agency of 
relations. Finally, the Baoshan founder Lingyu represented the work of the 
practitioner as that of a repentant supplicant.  
However, his notion of the reception of buddha-aid is founded on the 
premise that the mind is buddha-aid. Aid is possible because of the mirror-like 
inter-reflection of identity and difference, emptiness and phenomena. The 
inter-reflection of practitioner and buddha is that of skilful means, which is to 
say, salvific illusion. 
It is as salvific illusion that the three modes of work come together. An 
absence of essence that is presence, an interactively constituted field of activity 
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and, ultimately, a practice – this is what is, from a Buddhist perspective. When 
the Buddhists of Baoshan made likenesses of their deceased that were 
enshrined like buddhas and practiced perpetually like devotees, I do not think it 
was because they misunderstood no-self and emptiness. Perhaps, with notions 
like ‘actant’ and ‘plasma,’ it is we who are beginning to negotiate our own 
working relationship with/as the agency of relations.  
 
 
